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INTRODUCTION
Seventeen years ago, researchers at the World ResourcesInstitute (“WRI”) put together the first additionality andbaseline analysis for a greenhouse gas (“GHG”) mitiga-
tion project. The project was the CARE Agroforestry Project in
Guatemala, funded by AES Corporation in 1989 as the first cor-
porate carbon offset project.1 There was little question that the
CARE Agroforestry Project happened only because of AES
Corporation’s concerns about climate change. AES would not
have pursued the project otherwise; in other words, it was clear-
ly “additional.” Such clarity of action cannot be seen in all the
carbon-offset projects that have followed. Indeed, “additionali-
ty” remains the single most contentious issue in the develop-
ment of today’s voluntary and compliance-based carbon offset
programs and GHG markets. 
What is there about differentiating between “non-addition-
al” and “additional” projects that has vexed offset-based emis-
sions trading efforts for so many years? Why are so many ele-
ments of today’s additionality debate basically unchanged from
the debates of five or ten years ago? Is additionality even that
important? Is it key to today’s offset-based emissions trading
programs, as some observers argue, or should we simply drop it
in favor of “getting things done,” as others argue? If it is key, is
there a viable path through the additionality conundrum, or do
we need to scale back expectations for offset-based emissions
reduction programs? 
To help the search for a viable path, this article takes a step
back from the day-to-day additionality debates taking place in
today’s voluntary and compliance-based GHG markets. Instead,
the article looks at additionality through the lens of statistical
hypothesis testing – i.e. the task of controlling for “phantom
reductions” (“false positives”) and “lost opportunities” (“false
negatives”) when testing a hypothesis – and explores how a sta-
tistical approach to additionality might be practically applied to
the design of environmentally sound markets for offset-based
emissions reductions. 
This article addresses four key areas. The first section
defines additionality and differentiates between the concept of
additionality and its application in practice. The second section
presents ways in which the elements of statistical hypothesis
testing can be meaningfully applied to additionality testing for
climate change mitigation purposes. The third section discusses
what the statistical basis of additionality testing means for the
environmental integrity of the supply of offset credits entering
the market. The final section presents policy recommendations
related to the design of offset-based GHG credit markets. 
Some of the analysis and recommendations presented in
this article are directly applicable to the ongoing additionality
debate surrounding the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”). The analysis applies equally well to off-
set-based emissions trading at any level, whether state-specific
(e.g. design of a California trading system), region-specific (e.g.
design of a trading system under the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative), country-specific (e.g. design of Canada’s offset sys-
tem), or internationally (e.g. the CDM). The conceptual chal-
lenges facing offset-based emissions trading are basically the
same, regardless of the specific trading system involved or what
kinds of offsets are being considered.2
A STATISTICALLY-DRIVEN APPROACH TO OFFSET-
BASED GHG ADDITIONALITY DETERMINATIONS: 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
by Dr. Mark C. Trexler, Derik J. Broekhoff, and Laura H. Kosloff*
* Dr. Mark C. Trexler is President of Trexler Climate + Energy Services, Inc., in
Portland, Oregon. He has worked in the climate change field since 1988 when
he joined the World Resources Institute in Washington, DC. He carried out the
baseline analysis for the first carbon offset project, the CARE Guatemala
Agroforestry Project pursued by AES Corp. in 1989. He has reviewed hundreds
of offset projects, worked extensively on offset-based emissions trading mecha-
nisms, and written extensively on the subject of additionality. Dr. Trexler wel-
comes comments at mtrexler@climateservices.com. 
Derik J. Broekhoff is a Senior Associate with the World Resources Institute in
Washington, DC. He is a primary author of the WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol for
Project Accounting, and has worked extensively on offset-based additionality
analysis. Mr. Broekhoff welcomes comments at dbroekhoff@wri.org. 
Laura H. Kosloff is Vice President and General Counsel of Trexler Climate +
Energy Services, Inc. She has worked on climate change legal and policy devel-
opments of since 1992. She oversees TC+ES's negotiations and contracting for
carbon offset projects, and has developed pathbreaking legal agreements among
private parties, governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations
addressing legal issues associated with the long-term reliability of offset projects.
© 2005 Trexler Climate + Energy Services, Inc.
Additionality: Never has so much
been said about a topic by so
many, without ever agreeing on a
common vocabulary, and the
goals of the conversation.
– Dr. Mark C. Trexler, presentation
at Additionality Side Event, 
COP-10 in Buenos Aires (2004).
ADDITIONALITY: CONCEPT VS. APPLICATION
Carbon offsets allow GHG emitters to continue to emit
GHGs in one place by procuring GHG “credits” from some-
where else (whether next door or around the world), thus meet-
ing either voluntary or mandatory emissions reduction targets.
In strictly conceptual terms, the need
for carbon offsets to be “additional” is
easy to understand. Emissions trading
systems are premised on capping over-
all emissions from a certain set of
sources at an absolute level. An “offset
credit” allows emissions from these
capped sources to increase with the
understanding that this increase is
“offset” by a reduction from a source
whose emissions are not capped, leav-
ing net emissions unchanged. To
accomplish this objective, the reduc-
tion from the uncapped source must be
a response to the presence of the offset
crediting mechanism. If emissions
reductions would have happened
regardless of any offset credits, then
issuing credits for them would allow
global emissions to rise beyond what
was intended under the cap. Credited
reductions must therefore be addition-
al to reductions that would have
occurred in the absence of the trading
system.3
For offset-based trading addition-
ality, this boils down to why a given
project is being undertaken. There are
many potential reasons for implement-
ing emissions-reducing projects. For
additionality purposes,4 the question is
whether the availability of offset cred-
its is a decisive reason (although not
necessarily the only reason) for pursu-
ing the emissions reduction project.
The question boils down to a kind of
thought experiment: holding every-
thing else constant, would a project
have happened in the absence of the
offset crediting mechanism (i.e. if it
and all other projects were not eligible
for offset credits)?5 If yes, then the
project is not additional; if no, then the
project is additional.6
Unfortunately, it is impossible to
definitively answer this thought exper-
iment. Even if we could read the
minds of project developers, they
themselves may not know what they
would have done under different cir-
cumstances. It is not even a “hypothetical” question, since a
hypothesis can be empirically tested. We are forced to seek a
second-best solution, namely designing questions that are
answerable. For additionality, these questions have taken the
form of what are generally called “additionality tests.” A variety
of tests have been developed; including mechanisms designed to
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TABLE 1 ILLUSTRATIVE* ADDITIONALITY “TESTS”
Additionality Test General Description of the Test as It Is Commonly Formulated
Legal, Regulatory, or
Institutional Test 
The offset project must reduce GHG emissions below the level required by any official
policies, regulations, guidance, or industry standards. If it does not reduce emissions
beyond these levels, the assumption is that the only real reason for pursuing the project
is compliance; the project, therefore, is not additional. Under some versions of this test,
the converse is true – if the project reduces emissions beyond required levels, it is
assumed that the only real reason for pursuing the project is to earn credits, and the proj-
ect is therefore additional. 
Technology Test The offset project and its associated GHG reductions are considered additional if the off-
set project involves a technology specified as not being “business as usual.” The default
assumption is that for these “additional” technologies, GHG reductions are a decisive
reason (if not the only reason) for using the technology in a particular project. 
Investment Test The most common version of this test (often termed financial additionality) assumes an
offset project to be additional if it can be demonstrated that it would have a lower than
acceptable rate of return without revenue from GHG reductions. The underlying
assumption is that GHG reductions must be a decisive reason for implementing a proj-
ect that is not an attractive investment absent revenues associated with those reductions.
Under some versions of this test, an offset project with a high or competitive rate of
return could still be additional, but must demonstrate additionality through other means. 
Barriers Test Under some versions of this test, an offset project is assumed to be additional if it faces
significant implementation barriers (e.g. local resistance to new technologies, institu-
tional constraints, etc.). Under other versions of the test, it must further be shown that at
least one alternative (e.g. the business as usual alternative) to the offset project does not
face these barriers. The underlying assumption is that GHG reductions are a decisive
reason that a project is able to overcome the identified barriers (particularly if realistic
alternatives do not face these barriers).
Common 
Practice Test
The offset project must reduce GHG emissions below levels produced by “common
practice” technologies that produce the same products and services as the offset project.
If it does not, the assumption is that GHG reductions are not a decisive reason for pur-
suing the project (or conversely, that the only real reason is to conform to common prac-
tice for the same reasons as other actors in the same market). Therefore, “common prac-
tice” technologies are not considered to be additional.
Timing Test The offset project must have been initiated after a certain date (e.g. the date of initiation
of a GHG trading program) to be considered additional. The assumption is that any proj-
ect started before that date must have had motivations other than GHG reductions.
Under most versions of this test, offset projects started after the required date must also
establish additionality through a second test.
Performance
Benchmark Test 
The offset project must demonstrate an emissions rate that is lower than a predetermined
benchmark emissions rate for the particular technology or practice. This test is premised
on the assumption that most, if not all, projects that beat the specified benchmark are
ones in which climate change mitigation is a decisive factor in the decision to exceed the
benchmark. The benchmark may also be used to calculate baseline emissions. 
Project In, Project
Out Test
The offset project must have lower GHG emissions than a scenario in which the project
had not been implemented. If GHG emissions associated with the project are lower, then
it is assumed that reducing emissions was a decisive reason for the project and that the
project is additional.
* This table is a summary and an introduction to the variety of additionality tests that have been circulated over
the past decade. It is not an exhaustive list of additionality tests, nor is it intended to provide precise definitions
of the different tests.
measure environmental additionality, financial additionality,
regulatory additionality, technology additionality, and others
(see Table 1). At their root, these tests all are trying to answer
the same question: would a project have occurred regardless of
the existence of drivers created by the trading system, or not?
In practice, it has proven extremely difficult for stakehold-
ers to agree on what tests to apply, as well as the circumstances
in which particular tests are appropriate. In part, this is because
people disagree about how well different tests perform with
respect to the underlying objective of the tests, i.e. judging
whether the project would have happened in the absence of an
offset crediting mechanism (or more generally, without concern
for climate change mitigation). As we shall show, however, it is
also because they disagree on the practical importance of getting
the answer to this question right or wrong when designing a
working market for offset-based GHG emissions reductions.
“PHANTOM REDUCTIONS” AND “LOST
OPPORTUNITIES”: A STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON ADDITIONALITY TESTING
This section presents several concepts from the field of sta-
tistical hypothesis testing and explains their relevance to thinking
about additionality testing. Our premise is that it is possible – and
necessary – to think about additionality tests in the same way one
thinks about tests in any other area of science or public policy. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #1 
There is no such thing as a perfect test in statistics. Any test
in almost any field – whether home pregnancy kits or eligibility
screening for social welfare programs – will, in addition to “cor-
rect” results, yield false positive and false negative results.7
How well a particular test works depends on how frequently it
correctly returns a positive result (its “true positive” rate) and
how frequently it correctly returns a negative result (its “true
negative” rate).8
Likewise, additionality tests are not perfect. They sometimes
will falsely indicate that a project is additional when the project
would have happened regardless of concerns about climate
change (i.e. a false positive). Emissions reductions from such a
project are effectively illusory, or “phantom reductions.”
Alternatively, an additionality test may indicate that a proposed
project is not additional when in fact it is (i.e. a false negative).
The potential reductions from such rejected projects can be
thought of as “lost opportunities.” As in statistical hypothesis test-
ing, any given additionality test will produce both types of errors
(see Figure 1). Additionality tests can thus be thought of as hav-
ing “true positive” and “true negative” rates, although empirical-
ly and precisely determining these values may be impossible. The
likely performance of different tests against key evaluative crite-
ria, however, can be qualitatively evaluated (see Table 2).
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #2
The relative proportions of false positives, false negatives,
and true results can vary widely depending on how a test is con-
structed and the nature of what is being tested. The proportions of
false positives and false negatives produced by a test will depend
on its rate of identifying “true positives” and “true negatives,” as
well as the relative proportion of true positives and negatives in
the real world. For example, a profiling test used to catch crimi-
nals might falsely implicate an innocent person one out of one
thousand times; one would say that it has a “true positive” rate of
99.9 percent. Nevertheless, if only one out of every million peo-
ple profiled is actually a criminal, then on average about one thou-
sand innocent people would be tagged as criminals for every true
criminal profiled.9 In other words, because criminals are so rare,
the proportion of false positives to true positives can be enor-
mous, despite the test’s high “true positive” rate. 
The relative proportions of “phantom reductions” and “lost
opportunities” making up the final credit pool will depend not
only on which additionality tests are employed (and how they are
designed), but also on how many non-additional projects exist rel-
ative to additional projects in the underlying population. It is
impossible to know empirically what these proportions are.
Nevertheless, projects that reduce emissions relative to historical
levels occur all the time and for many reasons without regard for
climate change mitigation, and the relative number of these proj-
ects can be quite high (see Figure 2). Under these circumstances,
even additionality tests that almost always correctly identify non-
additional projects could still result in a lot of “phantom reduc-
tions” in relative terms, since many non-additional projects are
slipping through – especially if the tests are not particularly good
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* This column characterizes how likely it is that a truly additional reduction will generate a “yes” result when the additionality test is applied to it. This rating, however, should not be looked
at in isolation. The “true negative” rate is also very important, since a low “true negative” rate means a lot of “false positives” are slipping into the credit pool.
** This column characterizes how likely it is that a truly non-additional reduction will generate a “no” result when the additionality test is applied to it. This rating, however, should not be
looked at in isolation. The “true positive” rate is also very important, since a low “true positive” rate means a lot of “false negatives” are being excluded from the credit pool. 
TABLE 2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OFADDITIONALITY TESTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
Additionality Test Ease of Development Ease of Application “True Positive” Rate* “True Negative” Rate**
Legal, Regulatory, or
Institutional Test 
Easy. Benchmarks
already exist.
Easy/Moderate. Once rele-
vant legal requirements are
identified, reviewing projects
against them is generally
straightforward. 
Transaction costs are low.
High, though not perfect. Most addi-
tional projects will have lower emis-
sions than required by law. However,
not all legal requirements are enforced;
a project with emissions that are no bet-
ter than required could be additional.
This test would reject such a project.
Moderate/Low. Many non-additional
projects may also reduce emissions
below legal requirements.
Technology Test Moderate. Done cor-
rectly, requires consid-
erable assessment of
what technologies are
likely to be additional.
Easy. Usually simply a mat-
ter of checking whether a
project is on the list of speci-
fied technologies.
Transaction costs are low.
Low. Depends on which technologies
are included, but many additional proj-
ects could use technologies not on the
recognized list.
Low/Moderate to Very High.
Depends on which technologies are
included. 
Investment Test Easy. The real work
under this test is left
to its application. 
Moderate to Difficult. Can
require detailed financial
analyses and possible disclo-
sure of confidential informa-
tion. Test results are often
subjective, and easily manip-
ulated. Transaction costs can
be high.
High in theory, Moderate to Unknown
in practice. In theory, additional projects
will be uneconomical without consider-
ing the benefit of an emissions trading
system. However, some economically
attractive projects can be additional (e.g.
because they face non-financial barri-
ers). It can also be difficult to objective-
ly define and ascertain a project’s eco-
nomic viability – e.g. the definition of
“economically attractive” can differ dra-
matically from company to company –
leading to uncertain outcomes. 
High to Moderate in theory, Moderate
to Unknown in practice. Again, non-
additional projects are in theory proj-
ects that are economical without car-
bon credit revenues. However, some
uneconomical projects may also be
non-additional ( e.g. because they are
required by law). Finally, in practice,
determination of non-additionality
using investment analysis is fraught
with subjectivity and uncertainties.
Project developers can establish radi-
cally different risk-adjusted hurdle
rates for projects in similar contexts. 
Barriers Test Easy. The real work
under this test is left
to its application.
Moderate to Difficult.
Requires project developers
to substantiate the existence
of barriers and convincingly
argue their significance. Test
results are often subjective.
Transaction costs can be high.
Moderate to High, depending on how
test is formulated. Additional projects
are likely to face barriers, but not all
barriers are easily identified. Barrier
tests can have burdensome evidentiary
requirements; some additional projects
may be excluded automatically. 
Moderate to Low, depending on how
test is formulated. Many (if not most)
non-additional projects will also face
some barriers. A project that faces
significantly greater barriers than its
alternatives may be non-additional if
it has a high-expected payoff without
GHG credit revenues.
Common Practice
Test
Easy/Moderate. Done
correctly, requires
considerable assess-
ment of how to define
and identify “common
practice.” 
Easy/Moderate. Once “com-
mon practice” is defined, it
is generally straightforward
to compare projects to the
definition. Transaction costs
can vary. 
High theoretically, Moderate in practice.
If “common practice” is perfectly
defined, most additional projects will not
be common practice. But specifying
common practice across all sectors and
regions is almost impossible. Even
“common practice” projects might be
additional in certain contexts, particular-
ly if common practice is defined at the
international, regional, or national levels. 
High to Moderate. Many non-addi-
tional projects will correspond to
common practice. However, depend-
ing on the technologies, generally
there will be some non-additional
projects that are beyond common
practice.
Timing Test Easy. Setting the date
is relatively arbitrary.
Easy. Requires knowing only
when the project was, or will
be, implemented.
Transaction costs very low.
High. If a project is truly additional, it is
likely to be under development or only
recently implemented. This may not be
true for all additional projects, however.
And many non-additional projects will
also have started after any given date.
Low, for the same reasons. 
Performance
Benchmark Test
Difficult. Done cor-
rectly, requires consid-
erable assessment to
identify sector and
country-specific
benchmarks. 
Easy. Once a benchmark is
defined, it is easy to compare
to the project emission rate.
Transaction costs low. 
Variable, depending on how benchmark is
set. Sensitivity will be high for a lenient
benchmark, since most additional projects
will have lower than average emission
rates. A stringent benchmark could effec-
tively exclude many additional projects.
Variable, depending on how benchmark
is set. Specificity will be low for lenient
benchmarks, and relatively high for
stringent ones. Even a stringent bench-
mark will probably recognize some
non-additional projects as additional.
Project In, Project
Out Test
Easy. Easy to Moderate. Usually
requires only comparing
project emissions to histori-
cal emissions. Transaction
costs vary.
Very High (Perfect). Practically all
additional offset projects will have
lower emissions than what would have
occurred in their absence. 
Very Low (Zero). All non-additional
offset projects would pass this test.
Only projects that do not ostensibly
reduce emissions would be excluded,
but these would not be candidates for
offset projects.
at correctly identifying the additional projects. The implication is
that we could easily face relatively large proportions of phantom
reductions or lost opportunities when applying specific addition-
ality tests, depending on the true proportions of additional and
non-additional projects that are being tested. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #3
False positives and false negatives can never be fully elim-
inated. Generally, as one tries to eliminate one error by modify-
ing a test or testing procedures, one will increase the magnitude
of the other error (see Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). In other words, if
you’re most concerned about minimizing the number of false
positives coming out of a test, be prepared for more false nega-
tives. 
With GHG additionality, we should expect efforts to
squeeze down “phantom reductions” to lead to more “lost oppor-
tunities.” Using an additionality test (or a combination of such
tests) to rule out all non-additional projects would lead to many
truly additional projects being excluded from the credit pool.10
An extreme example would be a “technology test” that allows
only projects involving practices that have no conceivable pur-
pose besides climate change mitigation (e.g. flaring coalmine
methane at an abandoned mine). Such a test would ensure that
recognized projects are additional, but would exclude a whole
universe of truly additional projects in other technology sectors. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #4
Arriving at an acceptable balance of false positives and neg-
atives is a key part of designing and choosing a particular test.
There is no “one size fits all,” partially because the relative
importance of false positives or false negatives can vary widely
for different testing situations. In the criminal profile test
described earlier, for example, whether one thousand false posi-
tives for every true criminal is acceptable or not could depend on
whether the “criminals” are petty thieves or terrorists carrying
nuclear bombs. Defining the appropriate balance can be thought
of as a policy decision more than a technical determination,
although technical data should obviously inform the process.
GHG additionality testing is no different. Defining the
acceptable balance between “phantom reductions” and “lost
opportunities” in the context of additionality testing is ultimate-
ly a policy rather than a technical decision. The appropriate bal-
ance will depend on weighing competing objectives, including
cost-effectiveness and the priorities of getting a trading system
into operation vs. near-term environmental integrity, among oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the four statistical testing concepts presented
here are not commonly discussed when debating additionality
standards. There is a common but misplaced notion that there is
a technical solution to the additionality conundrum. There is
almost no discussion of false positives and false negatives,
much less of their inevitability and the need to balance them.
There is even less discussion of the fact that this balancing must
ultimately fall to policymakers in determining the objectives of
the additionality testing in the first place. 
Critical to our arguments in this article is the assumption that
one can reliably project the market outcomes of particular addi-
tionality standards and choices. We believe that one can make
such projections with the right data and analysis.11 Although
many GHG market observers have expressed surprise at how the
Kyoto Protocol’s CDM has been evolving, in particular with
respect to small-scale and sustainable development projects, this
outcome could have been predicted – and, indeed, was predicted
– years ago as the framework of the CDM began to firm.
Before worrying too much about how to address the chal-
lenge of additionality in designing offset-based emissions trad-
ing systems, it is useful to answer the fundamental question of
whether additionality testing really matters in advancing climate
change mitigation objectives.12 The following section takes a
quantitative approach to looking at this question.
DOES ADDITIONALITY MATTER IN TODAY’S
INTERNATIONAL GHG MITIGATION MARKET?
Many business and even some environmental observers
have argued that additionality simply is not the most important
factor at this stage in the development of offset-based emissions
trading mechanisms. They point to the importance of getting
emissions trading frameworks into place for the future, noting
that near-term emissions reduction targets and trading are only a
first step toward long-term climate policy. These observers
don’t want to see the near-term gridlock on additionality impede
establishment of an emissions trading frameworks and are will-
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ing to trade off near-term environmental integrity in favor of
getting a trading system into place. 
Evaluating the relative importance of different objectives in
the design of an offset-based trading system is a policy judg-
ment. Technical analysis of GHG market fundamentals, howev-
er, can identify the implications of different design decisions.
This section will review some of these GHG market fundamen-
tals with this goal in mind.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #1
The universe of potential offset-based emissions reductions
is enormous. It is not difficult to identify many gigatons of
potential offset-based reductions; the volume of these reduc-
tions rises over time (see Figures 4 and 5 for project-based sup-
ply curves). These projects include many non-additional reduc-
tions that are occurring as fuel sources change for power gener-
ation, energy supply, and demand technologies become more
efficient, and fossil fuel prices rise. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #2
Alternative additionality standards could dramatically
affect the supply curve available to the GHG market. Figures 4
and 5 show that the supply curve for the global GHG market
looks very different depending on the strictness of the addition-
ality standard.13 Supply curves this different would have signif-
icant impacts on the market-clearing price for reductions as
market demand rises.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #3
Sources of offset credits differ radically in their additional-
ity “profiles” and in how they advance particular policy objec-
tives for the ultimate credit pool. For example, some potential
mitigation sectors are likely to prove almost entirely additional
in today’s market context (e.g. coal-mine methane flaring at
abandoned mines); others will be almost entirely non-addition-
al (e.g. existing nuclear power installations). Many sectors will
be characterized by a more diverse range of additionality out-
comes, making it difficult to differentiate between “true posi-
tive” and “false positive,” as well as “true negative” and “false
negative” reductions. In addition, sectors vary widely in costs,
contribution to sustainable development objectives, and other
characteristics. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #4
In an overall supply curve for GHG reductions, the distri-
bution of additional and non-additional reductions will not be
random. All else being equal, non-additional reductions will
tend to cluster towards the low end of the potential supply
curve; i.e. they will tend to be low cost and the easiest to get to
market quickly. If one thinks of non-additional projects as those
that are already going to happen without a trading system, then
there is no incremental economic cost for them to “produce”
GHG reductions beyond the transaction costs associated with
documenting and selling the reductions. 
GHG emissions reduction projects face significant uncer-
tainties in the market. Uncertainty about post-2012 targets, and
about different countries’ reliance on domestic policy and meas-
ures, is creating uncertainty about overall offset-based demand.
Uncertainty about the disposition of “hot air” and functioning of
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One reason additionality
continues to be so hotly
debated is that the Kyoto
Protocol’s flexibility
mechanisms were
originally designed for a
market that included U.S.
demand.
Note: “Severe” stringency would equate with minimizing non-addition-
al “phantom reductions” while allowing a large proportion of additional
reductions to go unrecognized (“lost opportunities”). “Low” stringency
would equate with recognizing many ostensible emissions reductions
without regard to additionality.
the CDM is creating uncertainty about overall offset-based sup-
ply. The combination of these factors creates considerable
uncertainty about credit prices, and makes it more difficult for
project developers to evaluate the business case for investing in
truly additional emissions reduction projects. This makes it
abundantly clear that non-additional projects – if they are able
to get credited – offer both the lowest risk and lowest cost
sources of credits for the market. Moreover, even where non-
additional projects have GHG reduction costs (including trans-
action costs) comparable to additional projects,14 the non-addi-
tional projects are likely to be brought to market faster because
the GHG returns represent an upside potential, rather than being
key to a project’s underlying viability.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #5
Demand in today’s international GHG market is not what
we had anticipated in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was nego-
tiated. Without the United States, the primary source of antici-
pated market demand is absent, yet most of the supply is still
available to the market. Figure 6 illustrates a representative bal-
ance between supply and demand anticipated in 1997 and the
situation today. The graph shows that absence of the United
States has resulted in a much smaller demand today than the two
gigatons of GHG reductions per year that were expected for the
first commitment period. It has not, however, resulted in a
smaller potential supply (except for supply that would have
come directly from the United States), conservatively estimated
here at five gigatons of GHG reductions per year. One reason
additionality continues to be so hotly debated is that the Kyoto
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms were originally designed for a
market that included U.S. demand. The reality, however, is that
the current GHG market does not include U.S. demand. In effect
we are developing additionality standards for a multi-gigaton
GHG market, while current demand is a fraction of that amount.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #6
When you combine the potentially radical imbalance of
supply and demand in today’s market, with an understanding of
the distribution of non-additional reductions in the supply curve,
it becomes clear that a large fraction of the projects whose
reductions are offered to the market could be non-additional. In
fact, the total number of available reductions from such projects
could conceivably swamp demand.
Whether they do swamp demand, of course, depends on
how effectively additionality tests are used to keep “phantom
reductions” out of the market. The proportion of “phantom
reductions” in implementing additionality tests becomes para-
mount. Even a ten percent false positive rate in a market where
five gigatons of non-additional reductions are available could
result in 500 million tons of “phantom reductions.” With
demand on the order of 700 million tons, this level of “phantom
reductions” could severely undermine the market’s effective-
ness in keeping total emissions within the cap agreed to by
industrialized countries. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #7
A different problem would occur if demand were much
higher. If annual market demand exceeded five gigatons, 500
million tons of “phantom reductions” might be acceptable, and
the focus of policy makers might switch to reducing “lost oppor-
tunities.” Compliance costs are a major issue when emissions
targets are ambitious and demand is high. Every additional proj-
ect that is erroneously rejected by an additionality test means
higher costs as buyers have to move further up the supply curve.
Thus, while the rate of “phantom reductions” for additionality
tests is paramount when demand is low, the rate of “lost oppor-
tunities” becomes important when demand is high.
In today’s market, potential credit suppliers overwhelming-
ly focus on ensuring that the rules allow their project into the
market. There is little understanding that this ultimately is like-
ly to magnify the supply and reduce market-clearing prices. The
result could be that participating in the market would be of rel-
atively little interest to anyone. Ironically, the only people ben-
efiting from the market under these circumstances are those sup-
plying “phantom reductions.” With a low market-clearing price,
project proponents will not be able to justify pursuing projects
that are additional. 
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At their root, these
[additionality] tests all
are trying to answer the
same question: would a
project have occurred
regardless of the existence
of drivers created by the
trading system, or not?
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In fact, potential credit suppliers have significantly varying
market interests. Developers with truly additional project oppor-
tunities should be advocating stricter additionality standards,
which will tend to raise market-clearing prices sufficiently for
them to participate. Instead, even project developers with clear-
ly additional projects argue for weaker additionality standards
or for abandoning additionality standards altogether because
they want to “get going.” They don’t understand that this is a
self-defeating outcome.
Additionality is pivotal to the environmental outcomes asso-
ciated with GHG emissions trading programs that incorporate
offsets from uncapped sectors or countries. Given market funda-
mentals, flooding the GHG market with non-additional reduc-
tions would be virtually inevitable if additionality were simply
ignored in the design of the emissions trading system. It may be
that getting an emissions trading system into place is more
important to policymakers than ensuring the market’s near-term
environmental integrity. But if that is the approach policymakers
wish to take, it should be made transparently clear, so that in-
depth debates over additionality rules can be largely avoided. 
More significantly, any suggestion that additionality should
be ignored must grapple with at least two key questions: (1) is
environmental integrity a necessary tradeoff in getting a trading
system up and running; and (2) is it realistic to expect, once a
trading system is up and running, that it will be possible to
retroactively fix the system to reinstate environmental integrity?
We do not believe that environmental integrity is a necessary
tradeoff, as discussed in the next section of this article. Also, we
question policymakers’ political and institutional ability to suc-
cessfully implement such a retroactive change. 
FROM ADDITIONALITY FACTS TO
ADDITIONALITY POLICY
This analysis shows that there is no “correct” additionali-
ty objective or additionality test. Additionality testing, howev-
er, will play a crucial role in determining every aspect of mar-
ket supply (i.e. the supply of recognized reductions or GHG
credits), including:
• The magnitude of the supply pool available to the
market (by specifying what can count);
• The cost curve associated with that supply pool
(based on the costs of potentially qualifying offsets);
• The magnitude and proportion of “phantom reduc-
tions” in the final supply pool;
• The magnitude of “lost opportunities” being kept out
of the supply pool and the opportunity costs associat-
ed with their exclusion from the market.
If participants in the GHG market and in the development
of offset-based emissions trading strategies accept this analysis,
it could radically change the nature of today’s additionality
debate. Instead of talking past each other about what the perfect
additionality test is, we could move to the concrete step of ask-
ing how to prioritize different policy objectives inherent in
establishing emissions trading programs. We could move to the
action step of thinking about how to pursue an effective addi-
tionality policy that accomplishes these objectives. This section
profiles how a better understanding of the underlying principles
of additionality testing can guide the development of addition-
ality policy.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #1
The objectives of an additionality policy need to be identi-
fied in order to guide the development and use of additionality
testing. Policymakers cannot bypass this obligation by simply
directing a technical body to design additionality standards. Key
design questions include:
• How important are the physical reductions associated
with the offset-based trading system as opposed to
other objectives, e.g. simply establishing a trading
system and/or creating incentives for climate-friend-
ly technologies and practices without concern for the
integrity of an emissions cap? 
• What is politically acceptable, particularly with
respect to the cost of credits under the trading sys-
tem? Additionality tests, by affecting the available
supply, can radically affect the resulting credit mar-
ket-clearing price.
• How big a pool of offset-based credits is needed? The
size of the pool has implications for additionality test
design. Too strict an additionality screen against a
given level of demand can lead to a constrained sup-
ply curve and much higher prices. Too weak an addi-
tionality screen against a given level of demand can
lead to an unacceptably high pool of “phantom reduc-
tions” available to meet that demand. 
• Is the goal to develop a standard for the near-term
GHG markets with limited demand or to develop an
additionality standard for a future, larger GHG mar-
ket? What tradeoffs are we willing to accept during
the transitional phase?
• Should the emissions trading system favor certain
sectors and projects?
Once these questions are answered, it becomes possible to
develop additionality standards that will advance the chosen
policy decisions. Not everyone will be happy with those stan-
dards at any given time; there will be winners and losers in
terms of who can play in the market on the supply side, and
what it will cost participants to satisfy their demand for reduc-
tions. We believe that most market players would be happy with
a functioning GHG market that delivers cost-effective reduc-
tions and satisfies environmental integrity objectives, without
agonizing over each project developer’s motivations.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #2
In order to understand whether offset-based emissions trad-
ing programs are supporting the integrity of the overall emis-
sions reduction targets, it is necessary to understand the relative
proportions of “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities” to
real reductions making it into the credit supply pool. As such,
the analysis necessary for such an understanding has to be
planned and budgeted as part of the development of the emis-
sions trading system. 
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #3
Additionality rules need to be adapted to market circum-
stances on an ongoing basis. In the face of significant changes
in market supply or demand, static additionality tests cannot
effectively balance the policy objectives of acceptably small
magnitudes of “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities,”
and the cost-effectiveness of the overall credit pool. 
Delivering a cost-effective pool of truly additional reduc-
tions in a 300 million-ton trading market is an entirely different
challenge than delivering a cost-effective pool of additional
reductions in a five gigaton market. Additionality rules designed
for a large market (or designed without attention to market size
at all) can result in little or no environmental integrity during the
“small market stage.” Strict additionality tests could limit
“phantom reductions” in a small market, but the price of credits
could rapidly rise as demand rises (due to a shortage of supply).
A single static additionality standard will not be appropriate for
every level of demand.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #4
The ideal goal is to pursue an additionality standard that
gets us as close as possible to both a low “phantom reduction”
risk and low “lost opportunity” risk. When offset-based credit
demand is relatively low, this is politically easier to do given the
existence of “low-hanging fruit” opportunities. As demand
increases and these opportunities disappear, it becomes much
harder to keep both sources of error low because pressure will
increase to ease rules that minimize “phantom reductions” and
promote those that minimize “lost opportunities.” 
A good first step in this direction is to identify specific sec-
tors that can form the backbone of an offset-based credit supply.
A relatively simple way to “evolve” additionality standards with
the size of the market is through a “technology test” that initial-
ly focuses on a limited number of carefully selected sectors. As
the market expands, the number of sectors allowed into the mar-
ket can be increased. This could allow creation of a cost-effec-
tive credit pool that grows as demand grows, while effectively
balancing false positives and false negatives. This approach
would avoid the complexity, if not the impossibility, of attempt-
ing to develop additionality standards that are intended to apply
to all sectors. It is simply not possible to design such a system
in a way that satisfies the objectives being pursued through
additionality testing; the lower the demand, the harder it gets.
The potential supply becomes too large very quickly, and non-
additional credits threaten to swamp the market.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #5
There is no true commodity market for GHG credits in an
offset-based trading system. GHG credits are not a convention-
al commodity; the supply and demand for GHG credits depends
more on policy decisions than on physical fundamentals.
Policymakers have three choices: they need to either choose the
additionality standards they want and accept the resulting
prices; determine the prices they are willing to accept15 and
design the additionality standards accordingly; or choose a com-
bination of these two approaches. This is illustrated in Figure 8,
which shows that what comes out of flexibility mechanisms
depends largely on what is allowed into the supply pool. Figure
8 portrays the easiest potential portfolio outcomes, namely cre-
ation of a low-cost, low-additionality pool, or a high-cost, high-
additionality pool. Generating these two kinds of portfolios is
easy. It will be harder, however, to generate credit pools with
more complicated (and desirable) characteristics. For example,
a low-cost, high-additionality credit pool requires careful pre-
selection of sectors that will tend to deliver low-cost and highly
additional reductions. As one adds objectives, including for
example the promotion of sustainable development objectives,
the complexity of the process increases. 
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #6
Well-designed additionality standards can avoid the mis-
placed urge to address additionality concerns through proxy
measures. Several such proxies are already in widespread use:
Proxy A
Making additionality tests more and more complex: With
gigatons of potential market supply, and relatively limited near-
term demand, even complicated rules are unlikely to prove
effective in balancing competing objectives. An excessive num-
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ber of “phantom reductions” are still likely to make it into the
market, in proportion to the limited demand, while the magni-
tude of “lost opportunities” grows rapidly as the complexity of
additionality rules increases. 
Table 2 suggests that it is possible to choose additionality
tests that are relatively easy to apply at the project evaluation
stage. Such tests can also effectively control for “phantom
reductions” or “lost opportunities.” When applied to individual
projects, most of these tests require simple “yes or no” answers
to clearly defined questions. A technology test can be restrictive,
for example, but it is relatively easy to determine whether a
project is “on or off” the list. Within specific technology sectors,
a well-defined “common practice” test can eliminate many
remaining “phantom reductions.” Where “lost opportunities”
are a concern, different combinations, perhaps involving legal
or timing tests, might effectively balance this concern with envi-
ronmental integrity. The most versatile kind of test is a per-
formance benchmark. In principle, a benchmark can easily be
adjusted to meet different policy objectives; it has the added
benefit of automatically setting baseline emissions for multiple
projects. Alone or in combination with other “yes or no” tests,
benchmarks could radically reduce the transaction costs associ-
ated with current approaches to additionality testing.
Designing these tests in the first place, however, would
require substantially more effort than the current system of proj-
ect-by-project additionality testing, where the burden falls on
the project developer. They also could be politically problemat-
ic, since they automatically exclude certain sectors or segments
of the market. Over time, however, these tests would prove
preferable to the requirements of barriers and investments tests
for extended weighing and interpretation of evidence for each
and every project.
Proxy B
Making the credit quantification process more and more
conservative: Such conservatisms can reduce the number of
“phantom reductions” from individual projects entering the cred-
it pool, but if a lot of false positive projects are making it through
the additionality tests, “phantom reductions” may still dominate
the pool. This is partially because those same conservative
assumptions, applied to the truly additional projects, can signifi-
cantly increase the proportion of “lost opportunities” and prevent
many truly additional projects from making it to the market. 
Proxy C
Too aggressively shortening the crediting period for proj-
ects and sectors: What we call “baseline creep” can be illustrat-
ed by a situation in which a few projects are approved under a
given additionality test, but then the additionality hurdle is sig-
nificantly (and prematurely) raised for future projects of the
same type. Policymakers will face pressure to reduce the num-
ber of credits generated at a later date if the market remains
small. Current CDM rules limit project crediting to three renew-
able seven-year periods or a single ten-year period; these rules
will encourage baseline creep by giving decision-makers the
ability to stop crediting a project when its baseline comes up for
renewal. Most project developers recognize this problem;
review of CDM project applications shows that developers are
more likely to choose a single ten-year crediting period, rather
than trying for renewable seven-year periods. Baseline creep is
one way to address “phantom reductions,” but like other solu-
tions to the problem of “phantom reductions,” it could easily
have the unintended and adverse effect of substantially amplify-
ing “lost opportunities.”
Last in terms of our discussion of how to apply additional-
ity facts to additionality policy, it is worthwhile to briefly
address the question of policy and sectoral baselines, since they
are being actively discussed in the context of the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM. The authors do not see the adoption of policy
or sector baselines as being “good” or “bad.” Much of the dis-
cussion around “sectoral” and “policy” baselines for the CDM,
however, either fails to address additionality at all, or suggests
that there is something fundamentally easier about addressing
additionality at the “sectoral” or “policy” levels than at the
“project” level. The statistical testing concepts we have
described, however, apply equally to “project,” “sectoral,” and
“policy” additionality. The same issues of “phantom reductions”
and “lost opportunities” need balancing and resolution, particu-
larly given that the magnitude of “phantom reductions” entering
the supply pool could be much larger under “sectoral” and “pol-
icy” additionality standards unless those standards are very
carefully developed. 
CONCLUSION
In today’s polarized debate over additionality, it is difficult to
map a path forward. Most participants (observers, analysts, and
agencies involved in development of additionality policy) often
do not seem to acknowledge the basic statistical principles we
present in this article. The CDM Executive Board is not charged
with making the kinds of policy decisions called for here; more-
over, it does not have the resources to implement the analysis that
would allow “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities” to be
estimated in order to appropriately balance policy objectives. 
We are not alone in calling for a reevaluation of our
approach to additionality. Many participants in today’s CDM
debates are in effect calling for the same kind of reevaluation,
including aggressive calls for streamlining the CDM’s addition-
ality and project-review processes. Unfortunately, simply
streamlining these processes, without consideration of the
implications of changes for the environmental integrity of the
trading system, could put such market mechanisms at even more
risk of losing their political credibility.
Without a dramatic change in direction, the additionality
wars will continue, as they have for the last decade, with rela-
tively predictable implications: 
• Continuing efforts to make additionality tests for par-
ticular sectors more and more complex to trim down
supply sources that key interest groups dislike;
• Continuing efforts to streamline additionality tests to
allow more projects into the credit pool, particularly
from sectors that key interest groups do like;
• Continuing industry efforts to abandon additionality
standards altogether;
• Continuing environmental concerns that the environ-
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tionality. We use the term “non-additional” instead of “business as usual”
to avoid confusion. 
7 False positives commonly are referred to as Type One error; false nega-
tives are referred to as Type Two error. 
8 In statistics, the “true positive” rate is referred to as the test’s
sensitivity. The “true negative” rate is referred to as the test’s specificity.
9 That is, if the test has perfect sensitivity. With lower sensitivity, even more
innocent people might be falsely implicated for every true criminal caught!
10 This fact could make many market participants unhappy, particularly
those wishing to pursue projects that may fall into an expanding “lost
opportunities” pool as efforts to control “phantom reductions” become
stricter.
11 The literature evaluating the implications of different approaches to
additionality and baselines is extensive. See, e.g. Carolyn Fischer,
Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing
Tradeoffs with Baselines, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 1807-23 (2005).
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ENDNOTES: Offset-Based GHG Additionality Determinations
mental integrity of trading systems is not being main-
tained; and
• Aggressive and inappropriate use of proxies as an
alternative to effective additionality standards. 
These outcomes undercut the objective of credible offset-
based trading mechanisms. A successful GHG market should
advance environmental integrity and cost-effectiveness. It is vital
that stakeholders with an interest in this objective step back and
revisit the additionality issue in light of the considerations we have
reviewed. Appropriate additionality standards can be designed for
the GHG market – but only if participants properly understand the
market’s fundamental challenges and act accordingly.
This analysis is structured around the international GHG
market; however, the principles are applicable to any offset-based
emissions trading system, whether sub-national, national, or inter-
national. Additionality standards can reflect and accomplish key
policy objectives for the offset-based GHG market, but doing so
will always represent a balancing act. This can only be done effec-
tively if the objectives are specified upfront. Additionality per se
is not the objective; it is a means to an objective. 
We do recognize that the GHG market faces significant
challenges beyond those posed by debates over additionality.
Given the uncertainties over post-2012 emissions reduction tar-
gets, project developers do not know what value the CDM’s
Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) will have post-2012.
There is also considerable uncertainty over the role “hot air” will
play in GHG markets,16 contributing to uncertainty for project
developers of what value their CERs will have pre-2012 either.
These factors make it difficult to build a solid GHG market and
create strong incentives to get non-additional and low-risk reduc-
tions into the market. Nevertheless, these larger market uncer-
tainties do not alter our fundamental conclusion that additionali-
ty policy, if it is to advance the cause of credible GHG trading
markets, needs to be based on a solid analytical foundation.
We believe the approach in this article yields insights and
implications for future offset-based additionality policy. We are
not taking a stand in this article as to whether such policy can be
successfully implemented in the face of political and institu-
tional challenges. We are simply trying to make a statistically
well-founded point that additionality can be operationalized if
one recognizes and accepts that no test will ever be perfect, and
then adapts the process accordingly. 
